PHIL 521

Spring 2026 Part of Term 1

Part of Term 1
Jan 20-May 6

Credit: 2 OR 4 hours.

Intensive study of selected problems or topics in contemporary philosophy.

Approved for letter and S/U grading. May be repeated. Letter grading applies when offered for 4 hours of credit. For Stage 3 Philosophy PhD students this course is approved for S/U grading when offered for 2 hours of credit. Prerequisite: Consent of instructor for non-philosophy graduate students.

PHIL 521 class schedule data for spring 2026
CRN Type Section Time Day Location Instructor Section Details
51971
Lecture-Discussion
G2
3:00PM -5:20PM
M
402 Gregory Hall
Finlay, S
Part of Term:
1
Date Range:
01/20/26-05/06/26
Credit:
2 hours
Section Info:
"Many areas of philosophy are undergoing a "normative turn", with the notion of normativity center-stage in current debates. But there is little consensus on what "normativity" even is. This seminar explores the question from a mental perspective: what is it to have a normative thought? Assuming that the presence of a normative concept suffices to make a thought normative, how should we understand the nature of normative concepts? On cognitivist views, a concept is normative if it concerns a normative subject-matter (e.g. a normative property). But are there plausible candidates for normative content? On noncognitivist views such as expressivism and inferentialism, what makes a concept normative is rather a functional (e.g. psychological) role. But can noncognitivist interpretations do justice to the full range of normative thoughts we can entertain? Is the solution to these problems to adopt some kind of hybrid approach combining cognitive and noncognitive dimensions? Related questions covered in this seminar: How should we understand the distinction between "robust" and "formal" normativity? How can we reconcile the apparent contestability of normative concept application with the possibility of normative disagreement? Can there be alternative normative concepts, and should we replace our received concepts with others? Readings will be drawn mostly from recent metanormative literature."
Restriction(s):
Restricted to Graduate - Urbana-Champaign.
51548
Lecture-Discussion
G4
3:00PM -5:20PM
M
402 Gregory Hall
Finlay, S
Part of Term:
1
Date Range:
01/20/26-05/06/26
Credit:
4 hours
Section Info:
"Many areas of philosophy are undergoing a "normative turn", with the notion of normativity center-stage in current debates. But there is little consensus on what "normativity" even is. This seminar explores the question from a mental perspective: what is it to have a normative thought? Assuming that the presence of a normative concept suffices to make a thought normative, how should we understand the nature of normative concepts? On cognitivist views, a concept is normative if it concerns a normative subject-matter (e.g. a normative property). But are there plausible candidates for normative content? On noncognitivist views such as expressivism and inferentialism, what makes a concept normative is rather a functional (e.g. psychological) role. But can noncognitivist interpretations do justice to the full range of normative thoughts we can entertain? Is the solution to these problems to adopt some kind of hybrid approach combining cognitive and noncognitive dimensions? Related questions covered in this seminar: How should we understand the distinction between "robust" and "formal" normativity? How can we reconcile the apparent contestability of normative concept application with the possibility of normative disagreement? Can there be alternative normative concepts, and should we replace our received concepts with others? Readings will be drawn mostly from recent metanormative literature."
Restriction(s):
Restricted to Graduate - Urbana-Champaign.
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