PHIL 511

Fall 2011 Part of Term 1

Part of Term 1
Aug 22-Dec 7

Seminar Ethical Theory

Credit: 2 OR 4 hours.

Intensive study of problems in ethical theory.

Approved for letter grading when offered for 4 hours; approved for S/U grading when offered for 2 hours - only available for Stage 3 Philosophy PhD students. May be repeated in the same term. Prerequisite: Consent of instructor for non-philosophy graduate students.

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PHIL 511 class schedule data for fall 2011
	CRN	Type	Section	Time	Day	Location	Instructor	Section Details
	57452	Lecture-Discussion	1DS	3:00PM -4:50PM	W	Gregory Hall	Sussman, D	Part of Term: 1 Date Range: 08/22/11-12/07/11 Credit: 2 hours Section Info: This seminar will focus on moral constructivism. Constructivists deny that there are ethical facts that are prior to our ways of thinking and reasoning about them. Instead, constructivists hold that what makes a moral claim true is that it is what rational agents would accept or agree to after an appropriate process of reflection, argument, or negotiation. Supposedly, this strategy preserves the objectivity, rationality, and authority of morality that make realist views appealing, but without incurring the metaphysical, epistemic, and motivation problems of realism. Our central question will be whether there is any form of constructivism that can make good on this promise without smuggling in the kinds of realist commitments that it claims to avoid. The primary readings will be Korsgaard’s The Sources of Normativity, Scanlon’s What We Owe to Each Other, and Darwall’s The Second-Person Standpoint, along with work from Gauthier, Velleman, and Parfit.
	57451	Lecture-Discussion	DGS	3:00PM -4:50PM	W	Gregory Hall	Sussman, D	Part of Term: 1 Date Range: 08/22/11-12/07/11 Credit: 4 hours Section Info: This seminar will focus on moral constructivism. Constructivists deny that there are ethical facts that are prior to our ways of thinking and reasoning about them. Instead, constructivists hold that what makes a moral claim true is that it is what rational agents would accept or agree to after an appropriate process of reflection, argument, or negotiation. Supposedly, this strategy preserves the objectivity, rationality, and authority of morality that make realist views appealing, but without incurring the metaphysical, epistemic, and motivation problems of realism. Our central question will be whether there is any form of constructivism that can make good on this promise without smuggling in the kinds of realist commitments that it claims to avoid. The primary readings will be Korsgaard’s The Sources of Normativity, Scanlon’s What We Owe to Each Other, and Darwall’s The Second-Person Standpoint, along with work from Gauthier, Velleman, and Parfit.